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An Insurance Perspective on the

Medical Malpractice Crisis
Introduction by Nicole Williams Koviak*
Robert W. Mulcahey, a lawyer by training, has served as the Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer of Stratum Med, Inc. (Stratum) since
1998.1 Mr. Mulcahey also serves as the President for Stratum Insurance
Company, a captive segregated portfolio insurance company domiciled in
the Cayman Islands. The primary focus of Stratum Insurance Company,
SPC, is to provide professional liability coverage for the physician groups
associated with Stratum.
Speaking at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law's Annual
Health Law and Policy Colloquium, Mr. Mulcahey provided an insurance
industry perspective on the medical malpractice crisis, with a focus on the
ability of physicians to maintain coverage viability during the medical
malpractice crisis.2 Skyrocketing medical malpractice insurance premiums
and the lack of insurance coverage availability are forcing physicians to
look for alternatives to traditional insurance. Similarly, insurance carriers
have also been forced to respond to the medical malpractice crisis. For
example, in December of 2001, the largest United States malpractice carrier
in the United States, St. Paul Insurance Companies, stopped underwriting
policies for physicians.' Similarly, effective January 1, 2003, the insurance
* Student, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, class of 2004. Ms. Koviak is a
member of the Annals of HealthLaw.
1. In his role at Stratum, Mr. Mulcahey provides management to the corporation, which
provides a variety of services to eighteen multi-specialty physician groups, including 2000
physicians in Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio.
2. A recent study stated that "insurers blame rate hikes and policy considerations on
what they describe as a rising tide of lawsuits and $1 million-plus jury awards." Joseph B.
Treaster, MalpracticeRates Are Rising Sharply: Health Costs Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2001, at Al.
3. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (HHS), CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH
CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUT

MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 14 (July 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/
litrefin.pdf;

Symposium,

Medical Malpractice: Innovative Practice Applications

Transcripts,6 DEPAUL J.HEALTH CARE L. 309, 313 (2003) [hereinafter Medical Malpractice
Symposium]. St. Paul Insurance Companies covered nine percent of the country's
physicians. See Nat'l Governors Ass'n (NGA), NGA Ctr. for Best Practices, Addressing the
Medical

Malpractice Insurance
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branch of the Illinois State Medical Society stopped underwriting new
malpractice policies. 4 Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange also pulled out of
every state, PHICO Insurance Company went into liquidation, 5 and Frontier
Insurance Group left the market last year.6
Mr. Mulcahey emphasized that in response to these drivers, insurers have
looked to alternative risk financing. 7 Because of the tremendous growth in
the area of alternative risk financing, three alternative risk-sharing options
available to healthcare providers will be explored: captive insurance, risk
retention groups, and purchasing groups.
I. ALTERNATIVE RISK FINANCING MECHANISMS

Escalating medical malpractice premiums have caused physicians and
other healthcare providers to look beyond traditional insurance for more
affordable options in order to continue practicing medicine.8 If physicians
do not partake in these alternatives, they may be forced to leave their
practices altogether.9 Contributing economic factors such as skyrocketing
malpractice insurance rates, lower reimbursements, and high overhead may
even start to cause a shortage in certain specialties, such as anesthesiology,
cardiology, gastroenterology, neurosurgery, and radiology.' ° Nonetheless,
healthcare providers contemplating leaving medicine or abandoning their
current established practices now have several alternative risk mechanisms
that may allow them to continue to practice. While a comprehensive look at
these alternative risk mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief
look at each mechanism is instructive.
A. CaptiveInsurance
One common example of an alternative risk-sharing mechanism is
www.nga.org/cda/files/1 102MEDMALPRACTICE.pdf. The carrier's pull from the market
left sixty percent of Nevada physicians without medical malpractice insurance. Id.
4. Medical Malpractice Symposium, supra note 3, at 313.
5. See Nat'l Governors Ass'n, supra note 3.
6. HHS, supra note 3, at 14; Medical Malpractice Symposium, supra note 3, at 313.
7. Alternative risk financing methods provides healthcare providers with possible
alternative solutions to traditional insurance coverage.
8. Typically, physicians and healthcare providers seek medical malpractice insurance
from traditional commercial multi-line property-casualty insurers like St. Paul Insurance
Companies.
9. How High Now? Premium Hikes of 25 percent or More Are Now Common, with More
Double-DigitIncreases Expectedfor 2004, 81 MED. ECON. 1, 2 (2004) (noting that internists
practicing in Miami, Florida, are faced with the highest rates for internists in the country,
paying upwards of $65,000 in premiums, while general surgeons in Miami, Florida
experience premiums over $200,000).
10. Id.
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captive insurance. A captive insurance company is an insurance company
which is owned by the entity it insures. There are several reasons
companies establish captives, but historically captives have been popular
with organizations that have difficulty obtaining affordable insurance
coverage.
In light of the current expense of professional liability insurance, captive
insurance is an attractive alternative for physician groups and hospitals.
One of the main benefits of a captive insurance group is the reduction in
cost it provides to its participating healthcare providers by underwriting
their own insurance instead of paying third-party premiums.l A major lure
of captives, noted by Mr. Mulcahey, is that they allow participating
physician groups to pay more level premiums. Further, captive insurance
provides customized coverage to meet the policyholders' specific needs and
offers otherwise unavailable coverage with flexible funding and
underwriting. 2 Control is an important aspect of captive insurance as
captives not only offer physicians greater control over the underwriting
process, rates, claim handling, and their investments but also provide
incentives for loss control.
Although captives can effectively manage risk and eliminate some of the
13
overhead costs associated with a traditional insurance company, there are
inherent challenges in becoming a captive insurer. For example, a captive
insurance company has associated costs. Unlike self-insurance, a captive
has associated license fees, directors' fees, management expenses, and audit
fees. 14 Moreover, as Mr. Mulcahey pointed out, captives are having
difficulty getting funding carriers because fewer multi-line funding
companies are entering the funding business. In addition, exiting from a
captive arrangement can be trickier and more complicated than exiting from
other alternative risk mechanisms.
Despite the challenges, captive insurance is growing, not only in number
but also in form. When exploring captive insurance as an alternative, there
are three basic forms from which to choose: (1) a single parent captive, (2)
a group captive, and (3) a rent-a-captive. Although an extensive discussion
of each is beyond the scope of this paper, each arrangement will be
introduced and defined.
In a single parent captive, the most common form, the captive insurer is a
subsidiary that insures only the parent's risk or the risk of its brother/sister
11. Vt. Dep't of Banking, Ins., Sec., & Healthcare Admin., The Advantages of Captive
Insurance,at http://www.bishca.state.vt.us/captives/Advantages.html.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Gregory K. Myers, Commentary: Alternative Risk Fin. in the Traditional Ins.
Marketplace, ANDREWS INT'L REINSURANCE DISPUTE

Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

REP.,

May 19, 1997, at 3.

3

610

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 13 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 16

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 13

operations.15 A group captive provides coverage to a group of entities that
share similar risks. 16 Finally, a rent-a-captive is a captive insurance
company organized and managed by a conventional insurer for the benefit
of the insured.17 A healthcare entity may choose a rent-a-captive when it is
not large enough on its own or unable to capitalize a captive, but is willing
to assume a portion of its own risk and share in the underwriting profits and
potential investment income. Although a rent-a-captive requires less
management, less administrative control, and does not require a capital
investment, the insurer has more 'insolvency exposure. 18 Despite this
potential drawback, it is easier for a physicians' group to leave a rent-acaptive than to dismantle a pure captive organization.
In light of all of the options for establishing a captive insurance
company, creating a .captive insurance company is a viable solution for
physicians who are unable to obtain traditional insurance. Depending on
the level of risk one wants to take, the various forms of captives provide
physicians with additional flexibility and an opportunity to obtain
affordable medical malpractice coverage.
B. Risk Retention Groups
Another type of alternative risk financing option available to the
healthcare industry is the risk retention group. Risk retention groups grew
tremendously in 2002 with twenty-one new formations.' 9 Mr. Mulcahey
called the growth in risk retention groups a "gigantic jump" and noted the
all-time high in new registrations for risk retention groups. As Mr.
Mulcahey observed, seven out of nine registered last year were in the
healthcare industry.
One of the benefits of a risk retention group is the flexible licensure
requirements. Unlike a traditional insurance company which must be
licensed in each state it conducts business, a risk retention group is created
and licensed under one state's law, but is authorized by federal law to sell

15. Vt. Dep't of Econ. Dev., Captive Insurance: Glossary of Terms, at
http://www.thinkvermont.com/captive/faq.cfm [hereinafter Captive Insurance]. See also
Leon I. Jacobson, Self-Insurance Using Captives and Risk Retention Groups, and
Purchasing Groups, in 439 PRACTISING LAW INST., COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE 389,
394 (1987).
16. Captive Insurance, supra note 15.
17. See, e.g., American International Group (AIG), Types of Captive Services, at http://
www.accessaig.com/accessaig/public/about/aims/captiverent/0,4038,,00.html.
18. Id.
19. Cynthia Beisiegel, Risk Retention Groups Owning Up to Success, INS. J., Jan. 27,
2003, at 1 (quoting the Risk Retention Reporter statement that ninety risk retention groups
existed nationwide at the end of 2002).
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insurance in every other state without additional admission requirements.
Thus, physicians who form a risk retention group can obtain a license in
one state, but sell insurance in all states. In addition to flexible licensure
requirements, a risk retention group also provides its members with more
control over the liability programs. Because members of a risk retention
group own the insurance company, the greater control affords them lower
rates, broader coverage, effective loss control, risk management programs,
and stability of coverage.
Risk retention groups provide the typical advantages of traditional
medical malpractice insurance, but are not without challenges and risks.
Although risk retention groups offer their participating physicians lower
21
rates, flexibility, and a higher means of sharing liability, a participant is
required to provide an initial capital outlay to create a risk management
group. 22 In addition to the required capital outlay, members of a risk
retention group are also burdened by the premium payments. While the
financial challenges are one potential obstacle to a successful risk retention
group, financial instability is an inherent risk and is predicated on the
performance of the program's management.23 As a result, participating
24
hospitals and physicians face greater exposure to insolvency. Thus, while
alternative risk-sharing options could save money, participating hospitals
and physicians often assume greater financial responsibility and risk for
malpractice.
Not only are alternative groups risky from the participants perspective,
these alternative groups may also pose problems for claimants. For
instance, if one of these alternative groups fails, claimants seeking
compensation for their injuries may face even more difficulty in receiving
25
monetary reimbursement for their injuries than they do right now.
Despite the challenges and risks of risk retention groups, this type of
alternative insurance mechanism is gaining support from the states. The
District of Columbia licensed its first risk retention group on June 5, 2003.

20. Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Group v. Cuomo, 865 F.Supp. 1057
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated by Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Group v. Pataki, 85
F.3d 913 (2d. Cir. 1996); 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(4) (2000).
21. Beisiegel, supra note 19, at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), PUB. No. GAO-03-702, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED PREMIUM

RATES (June 2003), availableat http://www.gao.gov.
25. Id. at 40 (noting that claimants face more risk of not being reimbursed given that risk
retention groups are free from state insurance department regulation). Seeking
reimbursement from a physician personally is more difficult than enforcing a judgment
against a solvent insurance company. Id.
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As further proof of the growing acceptance of this mechanism, the Health
Network Providers Mutual Insurance Co., which offers medical malpractice
insurance for physicians in Houston, Texas, chose to structure the company
as a mutual company to convey to the physicians that it was their company
and that they had control over their insurance.26
Healthcare providers who want to participate in a risk retention group
must consider funding requirements, commitments to risk management and
expense control, the experience of the sought after risk retention group, and
any limits on the participants' liabilities. Despite the challenges of risk
retention groups, the benefits outweigh the risks and have allowed this
alternative insurance mechanism to experience extensive growth in the
healthcare industry.
C. PurchasingGroups
In addition to permitting the formation of risk retention groups, federal
legislation enables healthcare providers to form purchasing groups. Like
risk retention groups, purchasing groups have experienced dynamic growth
in the marketplace. However, unlike a risk retention group, a purchasing
group allows a number of members to purchase liability insurance coverage
together from an insurance company.27 Nevertheless, purchasing groups
share many similarities with risk retention groups.
First, both alternative insurance mechanisms are permitted under federal
law as long as they register with state insurance departments. 28
Furthermore, in order to participate in either form, federal legislation
requires all members to be involved in a similar business so as to expose
them to similar liability. 29 This common requirement provides for an easier
transition if a purchasing group decides to reorganize as a risk retention
group.
Despite the similarities, there are significant differences between
purchasing groups and risk retention groups. Unlike a risk retention group,
which federal law exempts from state law, a purchasing group is exempt
only from certain types of state law. 30 Accordingly, purchasing groups
must file in every state in which they intend to do business and a state may
require an agent or broker of the purchasing group to acquire a license.
26.

Ins. Communications, District of Columbia Licenses Its FirstRisk Retention Group,

RISK RETENTION REP.,

Aug. 2003, at 4.

27. 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(5) (2000); Ins. Communications, RRG/PG Basics, at
http://www.rrr.com/education/index.cfm.
28. Nat'l Risk Retention Ass'n, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.nrrausa.org/about faq.html.
29. Id.
30. 44 C.J.S. Ins. § 35 (2003); 15 U.S.C. § 3901(a); 15 U.S.C. § 3903(a) (2000).
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Additionally, the entities are regulated differently. The risk retention group
is regulated by its domicile state while the purchasing group is regulated by
both its domiciliary state and its insurer. 3 1 Also, unlike risk retention
groups, purchasing groups are not insurance companies and therefore,
maintain less risk.12 Instead, it is the insurer from whom the purchasing
group buys its policies who bears the risk.3 3 Finally, while risk retention
the company, members of
groups require their members to capitalize
34
SO.
do
to
required
not
are
groups
purchasing
Purchasing groups are advantageous to all parties involved. First, these
groups provide their members with tailor-made coverage, broader coverage
terms, lower rates, and occasional dividends.3 5 Second, purchasing groups
offer their insurers the ability to achieve greater profitability. Third,
members of purchasing groups achieve reduced premiums through the large
number of insureds in the group. Finally, the agents of the purchasing
groups are given the ability to add value to transactions and retain business.
While purchasing groups present another mechanism by which to obtain
affordable coverage for risk, physicians and other healthcare providers must
weigh all the nuances involved when deciding whether a purchasing group,
or any of the other alternatives, is the best option.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
ON STATE INSURANCE REGULATION

Over the last few decades, Congress has adopted federal legislation in
response to escalating insurance medical malpractice premiums, providing
physicians and hospitals with substitutes for traditional insurance coverage.
The Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981 (PLRRA), although not
enacted to help physicians or healthcare entities, served as a stepping stone
for legislation enacted later to encourage the formation of alternative risk
6
mechanisms to cover and insure medical malpractice risk. The PLRRA
was enacted in an attempt to make insurance rates more affordable for
31.

15 U.S.C. § 3901(a)(4); 15 U.S.C. § 3903(a).

32. Ins. Communications, What is the Difference Between Risk Retention Groups and
PurchasingGroups?,at http://www.rrr.com/education/index.cfmn.

33.

Id.

34. Beisiegel, supra note 19, at 7.
35. Ins. Communications, What Are the Advantages of Purchasing Groups?, at
http://www.rrr.com/education/index.cfm.
36. See Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-45, 95 Stat. 949
(1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3901). The PLLRA was passed in response to
the mid-1970s product liability insurance crisis. See also GAO, PUB. No. GAO/HRD-86120BR, INSURANCE: ACTIVITY UNDER THE PRODUCT LIABILITY RISK RETENTION ACT OF 1981
(Briefing Report to the Honorable Edward F. Feighan, U.S. House of Representatives) (July
22, 1986), availableat http://www.gao.gov.
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product manufacturers who had trouble obtaining certain types of
traditional insurance coverage, thus increasing the availability of
coverage.37 According to the United States General Accounting Office
(GAO), the PLRRA would enhance the affordability and availability of
insurance to healthcare providers "by allowing groups of product sellers,
manufacturers, and distributors to form risk retention groups or purchasing
groups on an interstate basis.

' 38

The Act limited the States' control over

insurance by exempting both risk retention groups and purchasing groups
from "any state law, rule or regulation or order," with certain exceptions.3 9
Thus, the legislation exempted risk retention groups from any
discriminating state statute or regulation against the groups or their
members, paving the way for medical malpractice insurance alternatives
which would also have similar exceptions from discriminating state law. 40
Subsequent federal legislation, the Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986
(LRRA), was adopted to expand the PLRRA and therefore allow risk
retention groups and purchasing groups for all types of liability insurance,
including medical malpractice, although still excluding personal liability
and workers' compensation. 4 1 The new legislation also expanded the
groups authorized to form risk retention groups beyond product
manufacturers to include almost all businesses. Accordingly, the new
legislation afforded healthcare providers the ability to organize a risk
retention group as an insurance alternative.
Today, physicians that form these new groups must be aware of
mandates states may impose. Although there are limitations on state
control, there are certain items that a state may require including:
registration with the state insurance commissioner compliance with orders
for delinquency or dissolution proceedings; inclusion of a notice in all
issued insurance policies that the risk retention group is not subject to all
state insurance laws and regulations, thereby making state insurance
solvency guaranty funds to be available; and compliance with hazardous
financial condition injunctions.4 2
Despite the potential state mandates that are permissible under the
37. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Ins. §29 (2003); Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Group v.
Cuomo, 865 F.Supp. 1057, 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated by Preferred Physicians Mut.
Risk Retention Group v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1996).
38. GAO Briefing Report, supra note 36, at 5.
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901, 3902.
40. 43 AM. JUR. 2D Ins. § 29 (2003).
41. A. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N, HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDES § 9:73 (2003),
availableat http://www.westlaw.com.

42. 15 U.S.C. § 3901. Other allowable state mandates include requiring compliance
with unfair claim settlement practices, payment of certain premiums or taxes, or compliance
with state deceptive, false, or fraudulent trade practice laws.
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LRRA, most courts have favored the alternative groups over state control.
In cases where risk retention groups have claimed that state statutes
discriminated against the group or its members, courts have looked to the
history of the LRRA.43 For example, New York's Excess Insurance Law
provided one million dollars of free excess insurance coverage to doctors if
their primary insurance coverage was written by an in-state licensed
insurance company. A group of anesthesiologists who formed an insurance
cooperative to share liability formed under Missouri law and offered
insurance to New York practicing physicians argued that the New York law
violated the LRRA. 44 Although the risk retention group eventually
withdrew its lawsuit, the court concluded that the LRRA's legislative
history indicated Congress' intention to exempt risk retention groups
for risk retention
broadly from state law "requirements that make it 'difficult
A45
groups to form or to operate on a multi-state basis.
On the other hand, in Ophthalmic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Musser the
court held that a Wisconsin statute, requiring healthcare providers to
demonstrate proof of financial responsibility by carrying insurance obtained
from an insurer licensed in Wisconsin, was neither discriminatory nor
preempted by the LRRA.46 The court followed the Eleventh Circuit's
reasoning in Mears Transportation Group v. State that the discriminatory
law must have a disparate impact on the risk retention group as compared to
other non-domiciliary insurers, rather than as compared to licensed carriers
in the state.47 Accordingly, the court held that the Wisconsin statute fit
within an LRRA exception allowing states to impose some regulation on
these entities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed this decision.
A recent example of how the LRRA has helped alleviate the medical
malpractice insurance crisis is evident in Pennsylvania, where several
insurance companies no longer provide medical malpractice insurance to
state physicians and hospitals. Consequently, as of January 2003, a total of
ten risk retention groups were formed in the last two years and now provide
48
The
liability coverage to Pennsylvania's physicians and hospitals.
retention
risk
that
claimed
has
Insurance
of
Department
Pennsylvania
43. See, e.g., Nat'l Warranty Ins. Co. RRG v. Greenfield, 214 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that the LRRA preempted the Oregon Service Contract Act given that the
purpose of the LRRA indicates intent to preempt state laws regulating risk retention groups).
44. Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Group v. Cuomo, 865 F.Supp. 1057, 1082
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
45. Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Group v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir.
1996) (quoting H.R. No. 99-865).
46. Ophthalmic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Musser, 143 F.3d 1062, 1070 (7th Cir. 1998).
47. Mears Transp. Group v. State, 34 F.3d 1013, 1016 (1lth Cir. 1994).
48. See Ins. Communications, Risk Retention Act Responds to Pennsylvania's Health
Care Crisis, RISK RETENTION REP., Jan. 2003.
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groups are beneficial because they provide "additional insurance coverage
options in a very tight medical malpractice insurance marketplace. ' '49
As a result of federal legislation, physicians and hospitals have new
avenues from which to obtain affordable medical malpractice insurance.
Healthcare entities have typically moved to the alternative risk market when
faced with affordability and availability issues. For this reason, many
healthcare captives were started during the crisis years of the late 1970s,
early 1980s, and the early 1990s, with the past two years reflecting record
numbers of captive formations. The reason for these formations is
primarily availability and the need to level out swings in the commercial
marketplace. Most healthcare entities can financially manage yearly cost
increases, but lack the ability to raise prices. Thus, thirty to one hundred
percent premium increases such as those faced by many healthcare
providers in a hard market is devastating. A captive or risk retention group
allows the physicians or hospitals to spread those increases over a number
of years. Likewise, the desire to control claims and defense costs are
reasons to form these entities.
III. CONCLUSION

Physicians have several alternatives, including captive insurance
companies, risk retention groups and purchasing groups, from which to
choose in order to maintain viability during the ongoing medical
malpractice insurance crisis. The lack of available and affordable insurance
premiums has caused these alternative risk financing mechanisms to
experience continuous and tremendous growth.
Instead of quitting
medicine altogether or giving up one's established practice, physicians now
have alternative risk sharing options which allow them to continue
practicing medicine. Each alternative insurance mechanism has unique
advantages and disadvantages but each mechanism allows physicians to
enjoy the increased purchasing power, cost-effectiveness, and flexible
savings opportunities that these alternatives offer. For this reason, captive
insurance companies, risk retention groups, and purchasing groups may
offer an escape from the high premiums of traditional medical malpractice
insurance.

49.

Id.
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